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A B S T R A C T   
The technical and economic benefits of artificial intelligence (AI) are counterbalanced by legal, social and ethical 
issues. It is challenging to conceptually capture and empirically measure both benefits and downsides. We 
therefore provide an account of the findings and implications of a multi-dimensional study of AI, comprising 10 
case studies, five scenarios, an ethical impact analysis of AI, a human rights analysis of AI and a technical analysis 
of known and potential threats and vulnerabilities. Based on our findings, we separate AI ethics discourse into 
three streams: (1) specific issues related to the application of machine learning, (2) social and political questions 
arising in a digitally enabled society and (3) metaphysical questions about the nature of reality and humanity. 
Human rights principles and legislation have a key role to play in addressing the ethics of AI. This work helps to 
steer AI to contribute to human flourishing.   
1. Introduction 
The development of artificial intelligence (AI) is often described in 
terms of human progress. The recent progress of machine learning, 
supported by growing amounts of available data combined with rapidly 
expanding computing capabilities and publicly available tools and li-
braries, have led to expectations of increased efficiency but also to new 
and better services for consumers and citizens. This broadly positive 
discourse is, however, counterbalanced by a discussion of the downsides 
and risks of AI. 
The ethics of AI is a topic of conversation in the disciplines concerned 
with these technologies including the social sciences, humanities, media 
and policy. Worries range from discrimination due to biased datasets to 
the domination of humanity by sentient machines. The social impact of 
AI-based technologies provides the backdrop and justification for the 
flurry of activities in public discourse and policy developments about 
whether and how AI should be regulated or whether other ways should 
be found to address the downsides of AI. 
A growing volume of literature suggests that governance mecha-
nisms need to be devised for these technologies because existing 
governance structures are not able to address the issues they raise. As a 
consequence, one can find numerous suggestions on various ways to 
develop governance structures that range from the informal, such as 
voluntary industry codes of conduct, to national and international 
legislation and the creation of regulators. 
One weakness of the current discourse is a disconnect between 
rigorous academic research on the content and implications of these 
technologies and the development of governance proposals. 
In order to move beyond the current discourse, gain a deeper un-
derstanding of the nature of ethics in AI, and allow for a critical 
reflection of the current discourse, we conducted multi-method and 
interdisciplinary research aimed at contributing to empirical and 
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conceptual clarity of the nature of these technologies, the challenges 
they raise and the potential of new governance structures to address 
these issues. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the discussion 
about how to identify, interpret and address ethical issues arising from 
AI applications1. The paper critically reflects on the term AI and explores 
which aspects of AI raise which types of issues and how these are re-
flected and addressed in organisational and societal practice. Bringing 
together conceptual insights and empirical findings, the paper is in a 
position to propose new ways to think about AI and structure the AI 
ethics narrative. In order to achieve this aim, the paper first seeks to 
answer the question of what precisely are the key ethical issues and how 
best to classify or categorise them. It then explores how existing 
governance mechanisms may be applied to these issues. This leads to the 
final question of theoretical and practical next steps. 
Our analysis shows that the ethical issues that arise in empirical 
observations are similar to those that the academic literature discusses, 
which provides reason for the belief that the discourse on ethics in AI is 
reasonably expansive. At the same time, however, it becomes clear that 
the meaning of these issues is largely context-dependent. We use our 
understanding of the ethical issues to categorise them into three broad 
categories: (1) issues directly related to machine learning, (2) broader 
social and political issues arising in modern digitally enabled societies 
and finally (3) metaphysical questions. These categories allow us to map 
currently existing and discussed mitigation and governance structures to 
these issues. This is an important starting point for the practical question 
of what can and should be done to address these issues. This question is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
The findings presented in this paper are important in several re-
spects. The paper makes an academic contribution to the quickly 
spreading discussion of ethics and AI and research around ethics, values, 
governance and tools of AI. The categorisation of issues suggested here 
and the mapping of the categories to different governance mechanisms 
can help streamline the debate. Due to the high practical importance of 
the underlying technologies, the paper also has practical importance for 
stakeholders faced with the practical challenge of proactively engaging 
with the ethics of AI. The paper can help organisations developing, 
deploying or using AI to identify issues they are likely to face and engage 
with governance mechanisms that can address these issues. 
In order to develop the argument, the paper proceeds as follows. In 
the next section, we discuss the governance of AI, looking first at defi-
nitions, followed by a discussion of ethical issues and currently proposed 
governance structures. We then describe our multi-dimensional empir-
ical study of AI. The findings and discussion give rise to our catego-
risation of issues, which we then map to governance structures and 
stakeholders. Our discussion and conclusions demonstrate the novelty 
and relevance of our findings while we propose next steps. 
2. Governance of AI 
This section provides the conceptual basis of tthis article and gives an 
overview of current discussions regarding AI, its ethical implications and 
possible governance structures. The term ’governance’ as developed in 
political sciences traditionally refers to alternatives to formal govern-
ment on a societal or state level. In business research, it frequently refers 
to structures and processes within organisations, whereas on a higher 
level the term ’regulation’ is used (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000). How-
ever, ’governance’ is increasingly used to describe a much broader array 
of “[…] processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, 
market, or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal 
organization, or territory, and whether through laws, norms, power, or 
language” (Bevir, 2012, p. 1). The term also refers to specific localised 
ways of organising (or governing) particular issues, as in data gover-
nance (Khatri & Brown, 2010) or information governance (ISO, 2008), 
rendering it suitable to describe ways of dealing with AI that cover many 
societal actors and activities. 
2.1. AI and big data 
The concept of AI, while much discussed, is not well defined. A 
typical definition of AI is the one provided by the European Commission 
(2018, p. 1): “Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to systems that display 
intelligent behaviour by analysing their environment and taking actions 
– with some degree of autonomy – to achieve specific goals.” This is 
consistent with Haenlein and Kaplan (2019) emphasis on the interpre-
tation of external data, learning from such data and using data for the 
achievement of specific goals. While such definitions are sufficient to 
give an idea of the scope of AI, they are arguably not specific enough to 
allow the identification of specific ethical issues or the application of 
governance structures. Definitions such as the EC’s can also be prob-
lematic when they seem to imply contentious positions, such as that AI 
can behave, analyse and act, which can be read as imputing character-
istics, notably that of independent agency, that current machine 
learning technologies do not display. This points to metaphysical as-
sumptions about AI to which we return to below. 
One reason for these shortcomings is that the definitions hide the 
immense breadth and depth of the underlying AI research (Elsevier, 
2018). The current prominence of AI is based on long-established 
principles of machine learning, often implemented through (deep) 
neural networks. These have recently gained prominence due to the 
increased availability of computing power and large data sets for 
training purposes. Ethical discussions of AI therefore need to be sensitive 
to both the consequences of the application of AI algorithms and tech-
niques as well as the ethical aspects of (big) data analytics (B. D. Mit-
telstadt, Allo, Taddeo, Wachter, & Floridi, 2016; Nerurkar, Wadephul, & 
Wiegerling, 2016; Varley-Winter & Shah, 2016). Public discourse on AI 
especially focuses on machine learning and the empirical work we have 
undertaken covers technologies in machine learning and big data ana-
lytics. However, as we argue below, the ethics of AI debate is broader 
than this and refers to other concepts of AI, notably that AI technologies 
have broader human-like cognitive abilities. The concept of general AI 
goes back to the beginning of AI research and is sometimes referred to as 
Good Old Fashioned AI (GOFAI) (Moor & Bynum, 2002). General AI 
technologies do not currently exist, but they figure strongly in the public 
discourse. In order to be able to make sense of the broader debate, it is 
important to be aware of the entire breadth of meaning of the term. 
This paper therefore does not attempt to offer a comprehensive 
definition of AI or of any of its constituent technologies such as machine 
learning. Instead, it aims to bring greater clarity to the question what 
people refer to when they talk about AI and, more importantly, when 
they talk about the ethics of AI or about the ethical issues of AI. These 
conceptual questions are crucial to dealing with the ethics of AI and 
questions of governance. They pose the problem of delineating which 
ethical issues are related to or caused by AI and it complicates questions 
of governance, where the application area of governance mechanisms is 
often not clear, as we will show in more detail below. 
2.2. Ethics and AI 
The concept of ethics is even more contested and open than that of 
AI. In everyday English, it denotes questions of right or wrong, of good 
or bad. Following Stahl (2012), we argue that this everyday under-
standing of ethics constitutes the basis of explicit reasoning and aca-
demic reflection, which are the subject matter of philosophical ethics. 
Answering the question of why a particular action can be seen as good or 
bad or which processes would allow answering such a question is the 
1 We use the term "issue" in an open sense, accepting as issues whatever our 
respondents or the literature describes using the term. As a consequence, the 
issues we cover vary greatly in terms of scope and impact. Some are very 
precise and focused whereas other are large and fuzzy and cover entire areas 
where issues arise. 
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role of philosophical ethical theories. These include classical theories 
such as virtue ethics (Aristotle, 2007) which determines the ethics 
quality often action based on the character of the individual undertaking 
it. Other frequently used ethical theories include deontology, which 
focuses on the agent’s duty (Kant, 1788, 1797), or teleology which looks 
at the consequences and outcomes of an action to determine its ethical 
status (Mill, 1861). In addition to these well-established traditional 
ethical theories, there are more recent ones like the ethics of care (Adam, 
2001; Gilligan, 1990) and specific ethical theories aimed at technolog-
ical applications, such as computer ethics (Terrell Ward Bynum & 
Rogerson, 2003; D. G. Johnson, 2001), information ethics (Capurro, 
2006; L. Floridi, 1999; Luciano Floridi, 2010) or disclosive ethics (Brey, 
2000). 
Despite a rich history of discussing the relative merits of various 
ethical positions, the current discourse around ethical issues of AI makes 
little reference to philosophical ethical theories. Instead, the generally 
accepted approach to AI ethics seems to define mid-level ethical prin-
ciples, an approach pioneered by biomedical ethics (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009; The National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. (1979), 1979). This 
approach, sometimes referred to as principlism, is not without criticism 
(Clouser & Gert, 1990). It has the practical advantage of sidestepping 
long-standing ethical debates. But it is open to the charge that it fails to 
solve practical ethical issues, due to the apparent consensus on ethical 
principles that then fail to guide practical action (B. Mittelstadt, 2019). 
Nevertheless, the creation and compilation of ethical principles form key 
aspects of the ethics of AI debate (Anabo, Elexpuru-Albizuri, & 
Villardón-Gallego, 2019; Asilomar Conference, 2017; Boden et al., 
2017). In addition, most of the high-level interventions into the ethics of 
AI discussion are principle-based, such as the guidelines produced by the 
European High Level Expert Group on AI (HLEG on AI, 2019). For our 
purposes, it is sufficient to understand the prevalence of ethical princi-
ples in the AI discourse. We agree with Mittelstadt (2019), however, in 
seeing the focus on principles as limiting and will return to the question 
of an appropriate ethical theoretical basis for the ethics of AI below. 
Discussions of the ethics of AI tend to cover particular ethical issues. 
These are typically particular features of the technology or consequences 
of its use that the authors see as problematic. Many of these have long- 
standing histories in ethics of technology or ethics of computing, such as 
security, privacy or access. Some of them seem to be particularly linked 
to the algorithms that drive AI, such as problems of algorithmic biases 
(CDEI, 2019; K. Johnson, Pasquale, & Chapman, 2019; B. D. Mittelstadt 
et al., 2016) and many of them are linked to the compilation and 
manipulation of large data sets that are required for many of the current 
AI techniques (Metcalf et al., 2016; Nerurkar et al., 2016; Taylor, 2016). 
Some ethical issues are specific to particular application areas, such as 
finance or autonomous vehicles, whereas others are seen as broadly 
relevant to all AI areas. 
2.3. Purpose of AI and governance proposals 
The number and reach of ethical issues linked to AI is enormous, in 
particular, when considering the breadth of possible application areas. 
Addressing them is therefore a challenge that has attracted much 
attention. One key question that needs to be answered before any 
mitigation measures can be developed is the role that AI has and is 
meant to have in society. AI, along with most other information and 
communications technologies (ICTs), has a particularly high level of 
interpretive flexibility (Doherty, Coombs, & Loan-Clarke, 2006), which 
means that it is difficult to predict how it will be used. This has been a 
key driver for thinking about ethical aspects of ICTs for decades, 
sometimes discussed under the heading of “logical malleability” (Moor, 
1985). What this means is that even in cases where a technology is 
designed for a particular purpose, it is difficult to foresee whether and to 
what degree it will be used for this purpose. 
We distinguish between different purposes of making use of AI. The 
first and most prominent purpose is to improve processes and efficiency. 
For organisations using AI, this translates into lower costs, higher pro-
ductivity and, eventually, higher profits. The second purpose is the use 
for social control. AI techniques are the enablers for voice and face 
recognition and can therefore be used for surveillance and tracking in-
dividuals. This is the basis for controlling individuals to ensure they 
follow specific requirements. This is the underlying idea of the Chinese 
Social Credit System (Liu, 2019). The third purpose of using AI is to 
promote human flourishing. Flourishing is an ethical principle typically 
associated with virtue ethics, which has a well-established history of 
application to digital technologies (T. W. Bynum, 2006) and which has 
been used to frame the AI debate more recently (ALLEA & Royal Society, 
2019). It is not always trivial to determine what constitutes flourishing 
or how technology can contribute to it. However, any attempts to use ‘AI 
for Good’, as the title of the series of summits organised by the Inter-
national Telecommunication Union suggests (https://aiforgood.itu.int/ 
), can count in this category. 
We realise that this is a strong simplification and that these in-
tentions and purposes of AI are not necessarily mutually exclusive and 
do not comprehensively cover all possibilities. The need for contact 
tracing to fight a pandemic, for example, shows that social control can 
be conducive to human flourishing. Similarly, the optimisation of pro-
cesses and resulting profit maximisation leads to higher income and 
welfare, which can (but do not have to) contribute to broader human 
flourishing. The Venn diagram in Fig. 1 indicates that the three different 
purposes can intersect and overlap. However, they are recognisably 
different ways of approaching AI and have different ethical implications 
and connotations. 
Intentions behind promoting AI are important to understand and 
evaluate perceptions of ethics and possible governance mechanisms 
employed to address ethical issues. These intentions do not develop in 
isolation but form part of a larger socio-economic, cultural and political 
context that influences the way a ‘good society’ is perceived and the role 
AI can play in it (Cath, Wachter, Mittelstadt, Taddeo, & Floridi, 2016). 
We do not wish to overstate differences between regions or underesti-
mate levels of disagreement within political cultures, but we think it is 
probably safe to say that the European approach to AI aims to promote 
human flourishing, even where this may lead to trade-offs with effi-
ciency or access, which may result from specific interventions, such as 
the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (General Data 
Protection Regulation, 2016; see also Kaplan & Haenlein, 2019). 
In order to assess whether a response to an ethical issue is appro-
priate or likely to be successful, we need to not only understand the 
purpose of AI, but also the range of possible options used to address the 
issue. This paper does not offer the space to review all governance ar-
rangements or tools that are available to implement them (see Hagen-
dorff, 2019; Morley, Floridi, Kinsey, & Elhalal, 2019). For the purposes 
of this paper, we seek to understand the types and levels of activity that 
aim to provide governance mechanisms for AI. Below, we distinguish 
between measures aimed at the individual, the organisation and society. 
Fig. 1. Possible purposes of AI.  
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Governance structures that support the identification and mitigation 
of possible ethical issues of AI cover all levels, notably the individual, 
organisational and political / societal. Individual researchers and de-
velopers can make use of a quickly growing number of AI ethics 
frameworks originating from companies, governments or other organi-
sations. The EU’s High Level Expert Group is a pertinent example (HLEG 
on AI, 2019) but many others exist. Individual developers can make use 
of professional guidance, for example, from bodies such as the ACM or 
BCS (Brinkman et al., 2017). Standardisation initiatives, such as the 
ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42 - Artificial intelligence or the IEEE P7000 family of 
standards, consider the ethics of AI and, once agreed, can provide 
guidance. Development methodologies can be created or adapted to pay 
attention to ethical issues, for example, by integrating specific issues 
into the design process, such as privacy by design (Cavoukian, 2017; 
Hansen, 2016; Information Commissioner’s Office, 2008) or more 
broadly by adopting an ethics by design stance (Beard & Longstaff, 
2018; Iphofen & Kritikos, 2019; Martin & Makoundou, 2017). 
The second level of measures provides guidance for organisations to 
follow or adopt. According to Clarke (Clarke, 2019b, 2019a), established 
mechanisms of risk management can go a long way in allowing orga-
nisations to address the ethics of AI. Organisations can employ existing 
impact assessment approaches such as privacy (or data protection) 
impact assessments (CNIL, 2015), technology assessment (Grunwald, 
2009), ethics impact assessment (Wright, 2011), social impact assess-
ment (Becker & Vanclay, 2003) or human rights impact assessment 
(Latonero, 2018). They can extend existing governance mechanisms, 
such as those used for quality assurance or data governance (British 
Academy & Royal Society, 2017; Khatri & Brown, 2010; OECD, 2017), 
and ensure these cover AI. Similarly, many organisations have estab-
lished mechanisms for dealing with ethical and broader societal con-
cerns, often discussed under the heading of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) (Garriga & Melé, 2004), which can be extended to 
include AI and emerging technologies. 
The final level is the societal and policy level, covering national and 
international policy and regulation. These drive a lot of individual and 
organisational activity and therefore play a role in governing AI. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that policy and regulatory mechanisms play a 
prominent role concerning the ethics of AI. There are existing statutory 
instruments, such as the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation, 
2016), that clearly address some of the issues that AI raises. Similarly, 
there are principles of human rights, that are addressed and safeguarded 
in international agreements, such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights, that cover rele-
vant rights such as the right not to be discriminated against that have 
relevant applications to AI. Similarly, legislation in areas such as 
competition law, product liability or intellectual property can have 
consequences for AI. One type of regulatory instrument with regard to AI 
is the creation of a regulator to oversee AI development and use. This can 
be achieved by extending the remit of existing regulators, such as data 
protection authorities, or by creating new bodies. 
On all three of these levels, the individual, the organisational and the 
national / international, there can be different focus areas. AI can be 
looked at in general terms or specific application areas can be 
emphasised, such as AI in health, finance, politics, public services or 
Fig. 2. Overview of proposals for governance mechanisms of AI ethics.  
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others. In many cases, organisational or technical tools may exist or 
could be developed to support governance structures. 
The aim of this very brief overview of ethics and governance of AI, 
graphically represented in Fig. 2 (above), was to demonstrate the 
complexity of the topic area. The discourse of ethics and AI is currently 
characterised by a cacophony of voices and contributions. There is no 
lack of ideas or proposals. The challenge is to synthesise a manageable 
approach from the multitude of activities. This synthesis should start 
with a useful and manageable categorisation of ethical issues that lends 
itself to an analysis of suitable governance structures that can be applied 
to these issues. This paper attempts such a synthesis based on a multi- 
dimensional research approach, as described in the next section. 
3. Methodology: A multi-dimensional approach 
While there is a large and quickly growing literature on ethical issues 
of AI, much of it is anecdotal or speculative. In our research, we there-
fore aimed to combine academic rigour with detailed insights into the 
way in which AI is realised in society and a broad and conceptual 
overview of the field. No one single established methodology can ach-
ieve this. We therefore decided to use a multi-dimensional approach that 
involved using and combining several methods to collect and interpret 
data and develop an understanding of the field of ethics and AI. 
The geographical focus of our study is Europe. We wanted to know 
whether the influence of AI on human flourishing is noticeable in the 
way AI is developed and deployed. In order to understand this, to gain an 
in-depth understanding of the social reality of AI across different 
application domains at present and in the future and to understand the 
technical, ethical and human rights implications, we undertook a multi- 
dimensional study comprising the following: 
1 10 interpretive case studies of AI application in particular applica-
tion domains and organisations  
2 Five policy-oriented scenarios exploring near term (<5 years) use of 
emerging AI applications  
3 An ethical impact analysis of AI  
4 A human rights analysis of AI  
5 A technical analysis of threats and vulnerabilities connected with AI. 
The following figure is a graphical representation of the research 
approach (See Fig. 3). 
A single paper such as this one cannot hope to do justice to the 
complexity of five different major components of a complex multi- 
dimensional study as presented here. Each of these has been described 
in detail elsewhere (Andreou et al., 2019; Macnish, Ryan, Gregory, et al., 
2019; Macnish & Ryan, 2019; Patel, Hatzakis, Macnish, Ryan, & Kir-
ichenko, 2019; Wright et al., 2019). Instead of a detailed account of all 
methodological considerations, we focus here on a brief overview of the 
different methods and why they provided the insights we required for 
our research objective. 
The motivation for undertaking a set of case studies arose from the 
lack of rigorous empirical academic research of AI across application 
areas. While there are numerous studies of the impact of AI in particular 
areas, a broader understanding of AI required a set of comparable in-
sights in different settings. We chose to undertake a set of interpretive 
case studies (Walsham, 1995) because they allowed us to develop a 
detailed understanding based on the views of individuals and organi-
sations involved. There are certainly many more application areas than 
10, but undertaking 10 studies and doing a comparative analysis (Yin, 
2003) gave us the confidence of being able to develop a strong under-
standing across applications. We developed a case study protocol and 
pilot tested it during the summer of 2018. The empirical work was un-
dertaken in 2018 and 2019. We interviewed a total of 22 stakeholders 
across the 10 case studies. For each case, we furthermore undertook 
background research on the organisation in question as well as the field 
in which the case study was undertaken (e.g., AI in finance, agriculture). 
The analysis was undertaken collaboratively using NVivo Server 11. The 
partners wrote up case studies following an agreed template, cross- 
reviewed and published on our website (Macnish, Ryan, & Stahl, 
2019). All case studies were furthermore developed as stand-alone 
publications whose references are listed in Table 1. 
In order to broaden our understanding further, but also to go beyond 
the description of current technologies, we decided to develop a set of 
five scenarios. The social domain in which AI is employed was discussed 
simultaneously for case studies and scenarios (see table below). This 
served to broaden the range of insights. 
The scenarios were constructed with a specific focus on providing 
applicable insights that could help decision-makers, notably those 
working in policy development, to develop and implement governance 
mechanisms. Based on the rich history of scenario methods (Andersen & 
Fig. 3. Components of the multi-dimensional research approach underpinning this research.  
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Jaeger, 1999; Boenink, Swierstra, & Stemerding, 2010; Cairns & Wright, 
2017; Ramirez, Mukherjee, Vezzoli, & Kramer, 2015), we applied a 
modified methodology which we called “policy scenarios” (Wright, 
Stahl, & Hatzakis, 2020). At its core, a policy scenario aims at a rela-
tively short time horizon that is of relevance to policymakers caught up 
in election cycles. We aimed to develop scenarios that are relevant in 
several years. A second important aspect of policy scenarios is close 
stakeholder engagement. For each scenario, we organised a face-to-face 
workshop that included stakeholders and involved them in the revision 
and refinement of the scenarios. All scenarios were peer reviewed and 
made publicly available in June 2019 (Macnish, Wright, & Jiya, 2020; 
Wright et al., 2019). 
While the work on case studies and scenarios gave us the confidence 
to be in a position to understand a broad range of ethical aspects of AI in 
social situations, this knowledge had to be based on and complemented 
by current academic and other debates about ethical issues and human 
rights implications. We furthermore realised that it was important to 
understand the technical aspects of AI, notably questions of security and 
vulnerabilities of AI systems that have potentially large implications for 
the use and social impact of these technologies. 
The ethical and human rights analyses were undertaken as desk 
research drawing on appropriate sources of their various disciplines (i. 
e., philosophy and human rights law). We also conducted a study of 
security issues, dangers, and implications of the use of data analytics and 
artificial intelligence. We examined:  
• ways in which machine-learning systems are commonly mis- 
implemented or mis-used (and recommendations on how to pre-
vent this from happening);  
• ways in which machine-learning models and algorithms can be 
attacked (and mitigations against such attacks);  
• how artificial intelligence and data analysis methodologies and 
technologies might be used for malicious purposes. 
This initial review of security-related issues and possible sources of 
harm provided the starting point for further and ongoing studies of 
specific vulnerabilities of AI. The purpose of this task was to provide a 
baseline understanding of the current capabilities and applications of 
machine learning, including examples of potential malicious uses of 
machine learning techniques, and the implications of attacks against 
systems powered by machine learning. 
4. Findings and Discussion 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the discussion about how 
to identify, interpret and address ethical issues arising from AI appli-
cations. In order to achieve this, we need a comprehensive overview of 
both conceptual and empirical insights into AI and its use. We therefore 
draw on a range of research activities outlined below. The underlying 
empirical studies were not re-analysed but taken as the starting point for 
compiling and, more importantly, for categorising these issues. The 
important contribution to the AI ethics discourse that this paper makes is 
in the conceptualisation and proposed narrative which is based on the 
overall findings. It is therefore only possible to provide a high-level 
overview of the empirical work, all of which is published elsewhere. 
Our research showed that the breadth of ethical issues discussed in 
the literature is reflected to a large extent in organisational practice. A 
cross-case analysis extracting the moral issues that were raised in the 
different case studies showed a large number of ethical issues, many of 
them recurring, as shown in the following table (See Table 2). 
This table listing the ethical issues we encountered is the result of our 
data analysis and represents our interpretation and categorisation of 
what respondents shared with us. The terms used to denote the indi-
vidual ethical issues were discussed and agreed during the data analysis. 
The results of the analysis from the case studies were supported by the 
first round of our Delphi Study, which targeted experts in AI and big data 
(Santiago, 2020). Implemented as an online survey, the first set of 
questions was e-mailed to 231 experts, 50 per cent of whom were 
women. We received 145 responses.Following review of the data and 
data cleansing, 41 responses contained sufficient information to warrant 
analysis. The first (open-ended) question covered the same ground, 
asking “What do you think are the three most important ethical or 
human rights issues raised by AI and / or big data?” Fig. 4 shows the 
most frequently given answers: 
One important insight from our empirical work was that the many 
ethical issues discussed in the literature are reflected in practice. Some 
issues are almost ubiquitous, such as those related to privacy and data 
protection. This paper does not offer a detailed analysis of the issues, nor 
of the exact differences between the case study and Delphi study find-
ings. One key point from our findings is that clearly recognisable issues 
are well covered are roughly consistent. The Delphi study is under-
standably broader than the case studies that focused on organisational 
practice, including issues such as ’awakening’ of AI that do not play a 
role in current implementations of AI. Our conceptual review of the 
ethics of AI and the analysis of our empirical work agreed to a large 
extent, showing that the literature covers the same issues of individuals 
and organisations working with AI (See Fig. 4). 
However, while it was possible to analyse our data using widely 
accepted terms, we note that the local meaning of these terms varied 
widely. The meaning of the term privacy, for example, in a medical 
diagnostic context, in the use of social media for logistics prediction or in 
the case of agricultural optimisation, differs greatly. Privacy is “an 
inherently heterogenous, fluid and multidimensional concept” (Finn, 
Wright, & Friedewald, 2013, p. 26) and can be divided up into a number 
of sub-types (Koops et al., 2017; Solove, 2002). In general, privacy in the 
AI ethics discourse seems to refer to data privacy or information privacy 
which touches on various other types of privacy (ibid). Other theoretical 
positions on privacy (Tavani, 2008) are not widely employed in the AI 
discourse. While this connection is rarely made explicit, there is an 
underlying assumption that implementing data protection mechanisms 
is the way to ensure privacy, although this has been contested (Macnish, 
2020). This position is reflected in our findings where the frequent 
references to privacy as an issue were accompanied by a strong emphasis 
on often technical data protection measures. However, it is important to 
note that privacy risks take very different forms in these contexts, 
requiring different technical and organisational measures to ensure 
compliance with data protection legislation, but also to ensure that 
broader ethical issues are covered. 
Interestingly, our analysis of human rights concerns, undertaken in 
parallel with the case studies, found that the human rights issues that 
can be found in the literature are closely related to and overlap with the 
Table 1 
Social domains of case studies and scenarios (CS:= Case Study; SC:= Scenario).  
No. Social Domain of Case Study / 
Scenario 
Reference 
CS01 Employee monitoring and 
administration 
(Antoniou & Andreou, 2019) 
CS02 Government (Ryan, 2019a) 
CS03 Agriculture (Ryan, 2019b) 
CS04 Sustainable development (Ryan & Gregory, 2019) 
CS05 Science (Jiya, 2019b) 
CS06 Insurance (Kancevičienė, 2019) 
CS07 Energy and utilities (Hatzakis, Rodrigues, & Wright, 2019) 
CS08 Communications, media and 
cybersecurity 
(Macnish, Inguanzo, & Kirichenko, 
2019) 
CS09 Retail and wholesale trade (Macnish & Inguanzo, 2019) 
CS10 Manufacturing and natural 
resources 
(Jiya, 2019a) 
SC01 Social care All scenarios are described in detail in ( 
Wright et al., 2019) SC02 Information warfare 
SC03 Education 
SC04 Transportation 
SC05 Predictive policing  




Distribution of ethical issues across case studies.  
Ethical Issues CS01 

























Access to SIS ● ● ● ●  ● ●   ● 
Accuracy of Data  ● ● ●    ● ● ● 
Accuracy of 
Recommendations   
● ●  ●  ● ●  
Algorithmic Bias     ● ●  ● ● ● 
Discrimination ●    ● ●  ●  ● 
Economic  ● ● ●    ●   
Employment   ● ●  ●  ●   
Fairness   ● ● ●      
Freedom       ●    
Human Contact   ●        
Human Rights     ●   ●  ● 
Individual Autonomy        ● ●  
Inequality ●  ● ●       
Informed Consent ●  ● ●  ● ● ●  ● 
Integrity     ●     ● 
Justice  ● ● ●    ●   
Ownership of Data  ● ● ●  ●    ● 
Military, Criminal, 
Malicious Use 
●   ●    ● ●  
Power Asymmetries ● ●  ● ●  ● ●   
Privacy ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Responsibility ●  ● ●  ●  ●   
Security ● ● ● ● ● ●  ● ● ● 
Sustainability   ● ●       
Transparency ●  ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Trust ● ● ● ●  ● ● ●   
Use of Personal Data ● ● ● ● ● ●  ● ●   
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ethical issues described above. The human rights gap analysis was based 
on a combination of methodological approaches emanating from the 
interim results of case studies and scenarios, preliminary in-depth in-
terviews on cyberthreats and ethics as well as desktop research. Initial 
findings were cross-checked and combined to identify the most burning 
challenges to human rights in the digital world and start formulating 
solutions. The findings were mindful of the diversity and breadth of data 
collected and expected results. A list of commonly perceived human 
rights issues and challenges in the digital world was derived from the 
process, encompassing general and specific considerations as follows: 
Fig. 4. Delphi survey responses covering the most important issues of AI and big data (Santiago, 2020).  
Fig. 5. Key human rights issues in AI.  
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(See Fig. 5) 
In recognition that the relationship between ethics and human rights 
is complex (van Est & Gerritsen, 2017) and that human rights have an 
ethical core that must be safeguarded, the human right considerations 
were analysed on a scale of concepts and notions: (See Fig. 6) 
Formalising human rights at different levels is based on the recog-
nition that humans have ethical rights that need to be explicitly safe-
guarded. Human rights declarations such as the Universal Declaration 
are political statements, but they have long found their way into positive 
law. Europe, for example, has the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) at the international level, which originates from the 
Council of Europe but is authoritative in the EU legal order. The EU has 
its own legally binding human rights instrument, the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EUCFR), whose scope can be said to be wider and 
deeper than the ECHR, as evidenced in the table below. This is relevant 
because it means that many of the ethical issues identified by our 
research are not just ethical issues, but, where they relate to human 
rights questions, may well be open to adjudication in a court of law. The 
following overview of human rights that may be affected by AI is 
therefore interesting, as it shows where and how these human rights are 
enshrined in existing human rights instruments, namely the ECHR and 
the EUCFR (See Table 3). 
All of these rights and freedoms were raised as a concern in at least 
one of our case studies or scenarios, thus further demonstrating the 
broad range of concerns. The reason for including this table in the text 
was that for readers not familiar with the detail of our case studies, it 
shows a list of human rights that are easy to associate with AI use and 
demonstrates that there are legal instruments that could deal with these. 
As several overlaps were identified in terms of, for example, relevant 
legal instruments and types of solution proposed, these were intertwined 
in the establishment of a ‘blueprint’ of current and future practice in 
relation to the interrelationship of human rights, law, ethics and smart 
information systems, those systems that have AI and big data analytics at 
their core (Stahl & Wright, 2018). 
Human rights touch on or are directly part of many of the issues 
related to AI. Our analysis shows the breadth of human rights concerns 
using the European human rights framework. It seems plausible that a 
more direct application of human rights legislation to AI can provide 
some clarity on related issues and point the way to possible solutions. It 
is therefore not surprising that there are many voices that point to the 
application of human rights to AI as a key way of addressing these issues 
(Access Now Policy Team, 2018; BSR, 2018; Committee on Bioethics 
(DH-BIO), 2019; Council of Europe, 2019; Latonero, 2018; World Eco-
nomic Forum, 2019). 
4.1. Classification of ethical issues 
This paper has so far confirmed that there are many potential ethical 
issues related to AI. We have furthermore shown that there are 
numerous governance approaches, including human rights legislation, 
that can address many of these issues. An ongoing problem, however, is 
the complexity of the landscape, the fact that there are too many ethical 
issues and ways of addressing them to allow scholars or practitioners to 
keep an overview. 
Fig. 6. Concepts and notions employed for human rights analysis of AI.  
Table 3 
Selection of Rights and Freedoms (EU) with potential relevance to AI.  
Rights ECHR EUCFR 
Right to human dignity  Article 1 
Right to the integrity of the person  Article 3 
Right to liberty and security Article 5 Article 6 
Right to respect for private and family life Article 8 Article 7 
Protection of personal data  Article 8 
Freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion 
Article 9 Article 10 
Freedom of expression and information Article 10 Article 11 
Prohibition of discrimination Article 14; Article 1, 
Protocol 12 
Article 21 
Right of property Article 1, Protocol 1 Article 17 
Right to education Article 1, Protocol 2 Article 14 
Right to free election Article 3, Protocol 1 Articles 
39–40 
Freedom of movement Article 2, Protocol 4 Article 45 
Freedom to choose an occupation and 
right to engage in work  
Article 15 
Freedom to conduct a business  Article 16 
Rights of the child  Article 24 
Rights of the elderly  Article 25 
Integration of persons with disabilities  Article 26 
Right to health care  Article 35 
Consumer protection  Article 38 
Right to good administration  Article 41 
Right of access to documents  Article 42 
Freedom of movement and residence  Article 45  
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In the course of our research and engagement with the ethics of AI, it 
emerged that there are types of issues that can be clustered in a way 
conducive to finding appropriate responses. We propose three types of 
issues that have significant specificities to allow them to be clustered: 
specific issues of machine learning, general questions about living in a 
digital world and metaphysical questions. 
4.1.1. Specific issues of machine learning 
Machine learning and the various techniques used to achieve it have 
some characteristics at the core of particular ethical issues. Two of these 
characteristics seem most likely to raise ethical issues: First, many of the 
current machine-learning techniques are opaque, which means that 
even experts with relevant equipment cannot determine why and how 
inputs are transformed into outputs, e.g. how exactly a personal profile 
leads to a classification in terms of a mortgage application or parole 
decision. Second, these systems require access to big amounts of data for 
training and validation purposes. 
Resulting ethical issues are, for example, those having to do with bias 
and discrimination (Johnson et al., 2019; Macnish, 2012), which can 
arise on the basis of undetected biases included in the training data. 
Further specific issues are linked to the use of data, which may be per-
sonal data and which may allow additional insights into individual 
personal behaviour through AI and big data analysis. Questions around 
privacy and data protection therefore arise on this level as do concerns 
about security and integrity of systems, algorithms and data (Stahl & 
Wright, 2018). 
These issues are common to most specific applications of AI. Algo-
rithmic biases, discrimination, security and transparency are issues that 
are directly linked to the characteristics of machine learning. Others, 
such as quality and accuracy of data are closely related. Our case study 
analysis suggests that these issues are prominent among the AI users in 
organisations. They materialise and present themselves in specific and 
context-dependent ways. From the perspective of this paper, an inter-
esting feature is that these issues can become visible and are – at least to 
some degree – capable of being addressed on the project or organisa-
tional level. While these ethical issues represent some of those most 
frequently mentioned in our empirical research, it is important to see 
that many of the ethical issues do not seem to be linked to the technical 
properties of AI as machine learning but point to the broader socio- 
economic context in which these technologies are used. 
4.1.2. General questions about living in a digital world 
Our second category of ethical issues includes those that have less to 
do with the specific capabilities of AI and more with the way societies 
use technologies many of which incorporate elements of machine 
learning or other AI techniques. These issues play to a general feeling of 
unease with the way in which industrialised societies develop and the 
role that technology plays in promoting certain developments and 
inhibiting others. These issues are currently discussed in the context of 
AI because the expectation is that AI will greatly influence them, but 
they are better understood as questions that relate to how modern so-
cieties organise themselves using technologies such as AI. A key char-
acteristic of these technologies seems to be autonomy, i.e., the ability to 
act without direct human input. This, combined with higher levels 
ability to detect patterns and act accordingly, can lead to the replace-
ment of humans by machines. Another key feature of digital technolo-
gies with high ethical relevance is that they increasingly constitute the 
environment in which humans live. The malleability of digital tech-
nologies means that our realities can easily be changed. Maybe even 
more importantly, the constitutive element of digital technologies in 
modern social reality means that the owners and controllers of these 
technologies become immensely powerful in many different ways. 
Key examples of these issues are the influence of technology on 
economic and political power, the future of warfare or distribution of 
costs and benefits of AI. The high-profile example of the misuse of social 
media data for purposes of the manipulation of democratic elections in 
the case of Cambridge Analytica (Isaak & Hanna, 2018) is the most 
visible case in point. But while Cambridge Analytica represents a rela-
tively clear-cut case of misuse of AI and big data, there are broader 
questions about the economic and resulting political power amassed by 
the tech industry (Macnish & Galliott, 2020). The market capitalisation 
and therefore economic power of the big tech companies is now such 
that many observers are increasingly worried about the mere possibility 
of oversight of these actors. One resulting question is that of justice of 
distribution of costs and benefits. Big tech companies have the technical 
infrastructure and know-how to create ever-larger data sets and benefit 
from these whereas smaller competitors lack the means to catch up. The 
role of consumers and end users at present is predominantly passive; 
they produce data and consume services, but have little control over the 
use of their data. 
Other larger-scale societal concerns have to do with the question 
about what technology can and should do. A high-profile example of this 
is the use of AI-driven autonomous weaponry that has the potential to 
change the face of modern warfare (Defense Innovation Board, 2019; 
Sparrow, 2009). But there are many other examples where it is not clear- 
cut what machines can and should do, e.g., with regard to autonomous 
vehicles or care robots (Decker, 2008; Sharkey & Sharkey, 2010; Bernd 
Carsten Stahl & Coeckelbergh, 2016). 
Our empirical findings support the relevance of these issues. In fact, 
and somewhat surprisingly, ethical issues in this category constitute the 
majority of issues. Economic consequences, employment, fairness, 
freedom, the ability of having human contact, individual autonomy, 
inequality, integrity, justice, ownership, military use, power asymmetry, 
responsibility and sustainability all fall into the category. 
4.1.3. Metaphysical questions 
The final set of questions concerns what machines should be allowed 
to do and points to some of the deeper philosophical and metaphysical 
questions about the future of AI and autonomous machines and their 
relationship with humans. There has been a long-standing discussion 
about the change of human nature due to machines, the emergence of 
cyborgs (Latimer, 2017) and transhumans (Livingstone, 2015). In par-
allel, there has been discussion whether machines can ever become 
sentient or conscious (Carter et al., 2018; Dehaene, Lau, & Kouider, 
2017), whether there will be a singularity (Kurzweil, 2006) at which 
point machines will develop superintelligence (Bostrom, 2016). 
These developments are controversially discussed and highly 
contentious. They are based on the idea of general AI (Baum, 2017). In 
this paper, we do not take a position on whether these developments are 
likely or even possible. We also refrain from taking a position on 
whether current narrow AI can lead to general AI or whether a funda-
mentally different approach would be needed. In our case studies, we 
found no evidence of their being considered a current priority, but in our 
scenarios, there are examples of technologies that come close to this 
category. In the Delphi study, there was reference to ’awakening of AI’, 
which falls into this category. The reason for including them here is thus 
less their current practical relevance and more the fact that they are 
prominent and highly visible in science fiction, the media and increas-
ingly in policy discussions – which, of course, in no way reduces the 
legitimacy of the concerns they raise. 
The following figure aims to summarise these three types of ethical 
issues of AI (See Fig. 7). 
The classification suggested in the above figure serves as a starting 
point to explore how governance structures are positioned to address 
ethical issues. 
4.2. Governing the three types of issues 
The purpose of classifying ethical issues in the previous section was 
to render the broad array of ethical issues more manageable and impose 
some order on the chaos of AI ethics. In this section, we now look at how 
this can help identify suitable governance structures. Before we start 
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this, we should make it clear that we understand that the above classi-
fication is analytic in nature and represents one possible way of thinking 
about AI ethics among many. We hope that the distinction makes sense 
and is plausible, but we are happy to concede that it is not exclusive. 
Privacy, to take an example, materialises on the local and project level, 
but is seen as a societal question (Roessler & Mokrosinska, 2015), sub-
ject to legislation and regulation and arguably based on human needs 
arising from human nature (Locke, 2010). With this contingent nature of 
the classification in mind, we now look at how this translates to 
governance mechanisms. 
In our discussion of governance, we take the position that the 
desirable purpose of AI should be to support human flourishing. As 
discussed earlier, this does not preclude uses of AI for efficiency max-
imisation or control but implies that the overall aim of development and 
deployment of the technology should be to improve human lives. This 
position has the disadvantage of muddying the waters, raising difficult 
questions of what counts as flourishing and who determines this. It is 
also likely to require the balancing of competing goods, values and in-
terests. But it is arguably the purpose of AI research, development, 
funding and application on which most citizens in democratic states, and 
maybe most human beings, can agree. It is also aligned with the EU’s AI 
policies. Based on an agreement that AI is to support human flourishing, 
the question then is how ethical issues can be addressed and which 
governance structures can help us deal with them. 
To return to the suggested classification of ethical issues (Fig. 6) and 
compare this with the earlier description of governance proposals 
(Fig. 2), it is easy to see that there is no simple and/or linear relation-
ship. The two sets of classification do not align, but can be better un-
derstood as a matrix, where all levels of governance (individual, 
organisational, policy) can refer to all types of ethical issues (specific 
issues, general questions, metaphysical questions). 
In many cases, the issues that we classified as specific arising from 
machine learning appear easiest to address. They can be subject to the 
application of existing governance mechanisms. Data protection or se-
curity issues provide a good example. Data protection is furthermore 
governed by legislation and regulation, even though the details of these 
legislative requirements differ significantly between jurisdictions. Not 
only is there ample regulation, there are also structures such as data 
protection impact assessments (CNIL, 2017a, 2017b) or standards such 
as the ISO 27000 family that allow structured approaches. Similar ob-
servations apply to other examples of the specific issues arising from 
machine learning, such as algorithmic biases and subsequent discrimi-
nation. Unlike data protection, these are less comprehensively defined 
and regulated. A key problem here is that it may be difficult to under-
stand what exactly the issue is. There are several high-profile examples 
of these problems, e.g., where a system evaluating job applications leads 
to discrimination on the basis of gender or where predictive policing or 
parole decisions lead to discrimination on the basis of race. There is 
broad consensus that discrimination on the basis of gender or race is 
immoral and to be avoided. However, it is not clear whether other 
systems discriminate on the basis of other properties that are less high- 
profile and of which individuals are unaware. It is conceivable that a 
medical diagnostic system might lead to discrimination on the basis of 
blood type or a dating system would prefer individuals on the basis of 
their height. This raises questions about how we would even know how 
to check for relevant characteristics and, even if confirmed, whether and 
why this would constitute an ethical issue. 
These issues can be described in terms of transparency and 
explainability. At the heart of the problem is the fact that humans expect 
explanations that they can understand, whereas machine learning 
Fig. 7. Classification of ethical issues of AI.  
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algorithms classify individual cases on the basis of complex statistical 
calculations that defy simple translations into forms that are accessible 
to humans (Mittelstadt et al., 2019). 
This tension between human reasoning and machine-learning data 
processing is a reason why transparency is among the most visible 
ethical issue linked to AI. The prominence of transparency as a perceived 
issue may explain why the same term is used to denote an ethical 
principle that pervades the AI ethics guidelines (Jobin, Ienca, & Vayena, 
2019). The ethical principle of transparency is described as a way to 
minimise harm, improve AI, foster trust and improve AI (ibid). It is also 
linked to dialogue, participation and democracy. Elsewhere we have 
tried to unpack the normative implications of ethical principles, 
including the principle of transparency (Ryan & Stahl, 2020). Of course, 
while transparency may be perceived as obligatory, it does not in itself 
resolve the ethical or privacy risks at issue. Transparency only gets us 
part of the way to solutions. 
The example of transparency indicates that the ethical issues arising 
from AI are not clearly defined. The perception that something consti-
tutes an ethical issue does not by itself clarify whether this perception is 
accurate or on which grounds such an evaluation would be possible. It 
says little about the exact nature of the issue and its status from a 
theoretical ethical perspective. 
In the case of transparency, there is now a quickly growing research 
community that focuses on such questions of transparency and 
explainability of AI (USACM, 2017). While these questions remain open, 
there is at least reason to hope that they can be addressed on the local 
level by designing, testing and reviewing systems using appropriate 
methods, relying on professional expertise of developers and users and 
organisational capacity to develop the relevant expertise. The ISO is 
developing guidance for developers (e.g., TR 24368). Discussion within 
ISO has recognised that AI is not neutral, that values embedded in al-
gorithms are intentionally or inadvertently shaped by the pro-
grammers’, operators’, and third-parties’ own worldviews and cognitive 
biases and that ethical violations could also result from AI deployed or 
developed prematurely, applied without proper consideration of the 
ways it could negatively impact individuals or society. 
The second set of issues, those relating to general questions about 
living in a digital world, are not capable of being dealt with on the micro 
or meso level of the individual or organisation. This does not mean that 
there are no existing governance mechanisms that could be applied to 
AI. Nation states can make use of policy, legislative and regulatory op-
tions and this is happening at large scale with regard to AI. At the same 
time, there are many existing structures that may well be suited to 
dealing with at least some of the challenges related to AI, even if such 
structures can be criticised as having failed to deal adequately with the 
ethical, privacy and societal issues. Consumer protection legislation, 
competition law, anti-trust law, data protection law as well as human 
rights legislation may well be capable of regulating AI and its conse-
quences, at least in part. Similarly, existing regulators may make a claim 
that they can address the challenges of AI. This suggests a close affinity 
between this type of ethical issue and the policy level of governance 
options. The key to the resolution of these issues does indeed seem to be 
on a policy level, as they touch on constitutive questions of modern 
societies (e.g., who can own what, how do we distribute wealth and 
risks, the asymmetries in the power wielded by the big tech companies 
through their algorithms). Ethical issues of AI may be subject to existing 
regulation, but it is entirely possible that additional regulation and 
legislation will be required to facilitate human flourishing. Nevertheless, 
the policy level needs to be supplemented by actions on the organisa-
tional and individual levels. 
The most difficult area to govern is the metaphysical. Questions of 
general AI and its consequences are partly technical and empirical in 
terms of what technology can achieve in the hands of the big tech 
companies, intelligence agencies and cyber attackers (for example). 
They are also partly philosophical insofar as they refer to basic concepts 
and arguments. To some extent, e.g., where transhumanism displays 
religious characteristics [overcoming the body, the distinction between 
(mortal) body and (immortal) essence of the human], they may be most 
suitably dealt with by theology. While it may be difficult to deal these 
issues, they did not receive much attention in our empirical findings. But 
that does not mean that proactive attention to these issues would be 
misplaced or that it might not be advisable to think about early warning 
signs or trigger points where more attention should be paid to such 
issues. 
Insights from our case studies suggest that this way of looking at 
ethical issues and governance clarifies current activities. This paper does 
not provide the space for a comprehensive analysis, so suffice it to say 
that the organisations in our case studies focused on the issues arising 
from machine learning and on established and practical ways of 
addressing them. The dominant topics were security and data protec-
tion, which companies dealt with in ways to ensure they met their legal 
responsibilities. They focused on technical approaches to achieve these. 
In addition, companies developed oversight mechanisms and reflective 
capabilities, e.g., by instituting ethics boards or engaging with stake-
holders. Respondents were aware of the policy issues but not actively 
engaged with them. Similarly, as noted, the metaphysical issues did not 
play a role in the social reality of the case studies. 
One interesting point to observe is that in our case study research, 
there was little reference even to most of the governance mechanisms 
that we categorised as aimed at the organisational level. Activities like 
risk management, impact assessments or human rights integration into 
company policies were not mentioned by our respondents. This does not 
mean that the companies did not engage in them or that they were 
unsuccessful, but that in the responses to our questions, the respondents 
did not associate them with ethics of AI or big data. It will therefore be 
important for future studies to evaluate the effectiveness of these 
governance approaches. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have reported some findings and their implications 
from a multi-dimensional research study into the ethics of AI. Our 
starting point was the highly complex and often overwhelming AI ethics 
discourse that motivated our attempt to bring better empirical insights 
but also conceptual clarity to the discussion. 
One outcome of this work was the classification of ethical issues into 
specific issues arising from machine learning, general questions about 
living in a digital world and metaphysical questions. We hope that this 
classification is helpful in identifying issues and finding or developing 
appropriate governance mechanisms. 
Our discussion and mapping of existing proposals for AI governance 
to the three classes of ethical issues give rise to suggestions for further 
research as well as organisational practice. One important observation 
refers to the concept of AI and the implications of the use of a particular 
concept for subsequent insights. In this study, we started with an in-
clusive view of AI that covers not only narrow AI and machine learning, 
but also broader socio-technical systems incorporating AI techniques 
and artificial general intelligence. Our empirical findings show that the 
focus of attention in current use of AI is on machine learning and, to 
some degree, on broader socio-technical systems. This raises the ques-
tion whether it would be desirable to limit the scope of reflection, e.g., 
by focusing exclusively on machine learning. We suggest that the term 
AI is broader than machine learning and a rich conceptualisation of AI 
and its ethical consequences needs to take this into consideration. 
This paper has shown that a key next step in the AI ethics discourse 
needs to be a more detailed and thorough mapping exercise that not only 
lists and clearly defines ethical issues but explores to what degree these 
are novel or manifest inadequate regulatory structures and in need of 
novel solutions. As we have suggested above, the broad array of extant 
governance structures may be able to cover many of the issues raised by 
AI. Whether they do so adequately is another question. Where no rem-
edies currently exist, or existing ones are insufficient, further and novel 
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solutions may well be required. The work presented here suggests that 
the AI ethics debate can benefit from a different perspective, which we 
have offered above. This new perspective is based on a novel catego-
risation of ethical issues that point towards next steps and the bigger 
question about how the different types of issues can be addressed, which 
can be used to generate recommendations for organisations. Many 
companies are interested in exploiting the advantages of AI but are 
unsure about how to deal with societal and ethical issues. Our research 
shows that there are numerous existing activities, many of which are 
related and interlinked, that will go a long way towards showing that a 
company is serious about engaging with these questions. The integration 
of CSR structures into organisations in a way that takes into account the 
organisation’s research and development is one such step. An explicit 
commitment to human rights and the adoption of processes designed to 
integrate human rights into corporate processes would be another such 
step. These suggestions are, of course, no guarantees that nothing will go 
wrong, but they are serious steps in ensuring that the corporate culture 
supports human flourishing, through AI and otherwise. 
A similar conclusion offers itself to policymakers and decision- 
makers. Just as companies can look through a portfolio of existing 
governance mechanisms, policymakers should take stock of the ade-
quacy of existing policy and regulatory options while developing spe-
cific steps to address AI. Some of the issues discussed in the context of AI 
and the general questions arising in our increasingly digital world have 
little to do with AI in the narrow sense. Questions of justice, distribution 
and power may be exacerbated by particular technologies but exist in-
dependent of them. As a consequence, it may well be that existing 
legislation or regulatory bodies are in a good position to deal with at 
least some of these questions and the task for policymakers is to ensure 
that existing policy and the adequacy of its application are taken into 
account in the rush to develop new policy. 
The nature of integrating human rights into organisations and the 
creation of policy provides another pointer to lessons learned from our 
work. The way we deal with the ethics of AI will need to be sensitive to 
the conceptually challenging and changing nature of the technologies in 
question and the social perceptions they engender. We should simply not 
assume that we can provide a permanently stable definition of AI or of 
the ethical issues related to it. Instead, we need to embrace a world 
where concepts are changing and contested, where moral preferences 
change over time, where scientific, media and political discourses 
dynamically interact and where impacts of new technologies such as AI 
need to be adequately assessed. Ethical positions based on process and 
exchange, such as discourse ethics (Mingers & Walsham, 2010; Rehg, 
2014), are well suited to reflect the need for the ongoing negotiations of 
facts and values needed to make new technologies work in society. 
Our work immediately suggests further areas of study. The case 
studies, for example, while covering a breadth of activities, could be 
expanded to be even more comprehensive. Our approach was open and 
exploratory. Future empirical work could also test the adequacy of 
existing governance mechanisms as well as proposals for new ones, their 
impacts and possible side effects (e.g., a loss of social trust in existing 
mechanisms). A direct mapping of ethical issues and governance pro-
posals would be helpful in assessing the effectiveness of the governance 
proposals, an important factor in developing these further. Further 
research should also be undertaken to broaden the geographical scope of 
the study. Our European focus means that we simply took for granted 
certain aspects of the AI ecosystem that may not be applicable else-
where. This includes the strong legal data protection regime of the Eu-
ropean Union or the existing regulatory, industrial and professional 
settings that shape the way in which AI is developed, deployed and used. 
The international nature of AI renders necessary such further work. 
The high-level view of the AI ethics debate presented in this paper 
should make an important contribution to theory and practice. We 
believe that our proposed categorisation is helpful for both scholars and 
practitioners. It offers a way to navigate the complexities of the AI 
debate and helps individuals, organisations and policymakers to find the 
most suitable ways of moving on. It also shows that AI ethics is not a 
problem to be ‘solved’ in the sense that there are clear solutions that will 
make problems go away. Instead, uncertainties around definitions, 
ethics and values can form the basis for a creative but unpredictable 
journey towards a desirable future where new technologies including AI 
are conducive to human flourishing. 
This paper provides a clearer, more structured and inclusive narra-
tive of ethics of AI. It draws on a set of different research activities to 
develop a way of thinking about AI and ethics that covers the broad 
range of technologies that fall under the heading of AI, that covers the 
manifold ethical issues associated with AI and that provides a theoretical 
ethical position that can be used to reflect on all of these. It is clear, 
however, that this is only the basis for further work. The difficult 
questions about what stakeholders need to do, about which laws and 
regulations need to be updated or developed, about definitions of pro-
fessional or organisational responsibilities etc. still need to be addressed. 
Undertaking these next steps is important and urgent. It will also be 
greatly helped by an empirically based conceptual view of ethics and AI 
as we offer in this paper. 
Acknowledgments 
This research has received funding from the European Union’s Ho-
rizon 2020 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation under 
the Specific Grant Agreement No. 786641 (SHERPA). 
References 
Access Now Policy Team. (2018). The Toronto Declaration: Protecting the right to 
equality and non-discrimination in machine learning systems. Access No. https:// 
www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2018/08/The-Toronto-Declaration_ENG_ 
08-2018.pdf. 
Adam, A. (2001). Computer ethics in a different voice. Information and Organization, 11 
(4), 235–261. 
ALLEA & Royal Society. (2019). Flourishing in a Data-enabled Society (ALLEA Discussion 
Paper No. 4). https://www.allea.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ 
DiscussionPaper_DataGov_Digital.pdf. 
Anabo, I. F., Elexpuru-Albizuri, I., & Villardón-Gallego, L. (2019). Revisiting the Belmont 
Report’s ethical principles in internet-mediated research: Perspectives from 
disciplinary associations in the social sciences. Ethics and Information Technology, 21 
(2), 137–149. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-018-9495-z. 
Andersen, I.-E., & Jaeger, B. (1999). Scenario workshops and consensus conferences: 
Towards more democratic decision-making. Science and Public Policy, 26(5), 
331–340. 
Andreou, A., Shaelou, S. L., & Stahl, B. (2019). D1.5 Current Human Rights Frameworks. 
https://doi.org/10.21253/DMU.8181827.v1. 
Antoniou, J., & Andreou, A. (2019). Case Study: The Internet of Things and Ethics. ORBIT 
Journal, 2(2), Article 2. 
Aristotle. (2007). The Nicomachean Ethics. Filiquarian Publishing, LLC. 
Asilomar Conference. (2017). Asilomar AI Principles. Future of Life Institute. https:// 
futureoflife.org/ai-principles/. 
Baum, S. (2017). A Survey of Artificial General Intelligence Projects for Ethics, Risk, and 
Policy (SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3070741). Social Science Research Network. https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3070741. 
Beard, M., & Longstaff, S. (2018). Ethical By Design: Principles For Good Technology. 
THE ETHICS CENTRE. 
Beauchamp, T. L., & Childress, J. F. (2009). Principles of Biomedical Ethics (6th ed.). 
OUP USA. 
Becker, H. A., & Vanclay, F. (2003). The International Handbook of Social Impact 
Assessment: Conceptual and Methodological Advances. Edward Elgar Publishing.  
Bevir, M. (2012). Governance: A Very Short Introduction. OUP Oxford. 
Boden, M., Bryson, J., Caldwell, D., Dautenhahn, K., Edwards, L., Kember, S., … 
Winfield, A. (2017). Principles of robotics: Regulating robots in the real world. 
Connection Science, 29(2), 124–129. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
09540091.2016.1271400. 
Boenink, M., Swierstra, T., & Stemerding, D. (2010). Anticipating the Interaction 
between Technology and Morality: A Scenario Study of Experimenting with Humans 
in Bionanotechnology. Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology, 4(2). https://doi.org/ 
10.2202/1941-6008.1098. 
Bostrom, N. (2016). Superintelligence: Paths. Dangers, Strategies (Reprint edition): OUP 
Oxford.  
Braithwaite, J., & Drahos, P. (2000). Global Business Regulation. Cambridge University 
Press.  
Brey, P. (2000). Disclosive Computer Ethics: Exposure and Evaluation of Embedded 
Normativity in Computer Technology. CEPE2000 Computer Ethics: Philosophical 
Enquiry. CEPE2000 Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry, Dartmouth College. 
http://ethics.sandiego.edu/video/CEPE2000/Responsibility/Index.html. 
B.C. Stahl et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Journal of Business Research xxx (xxxx) xxx
14
Brinkman, B., Flick, C., Gotterbarn, D., Miller, K., Vazansky, K., & Wolf, M. J. (2017). 
Listening to Professional Voices: Draft 2 of the ACM Code of Ethics and Professional 
Conduct. Commun. ACM, 60(5), 105–111. https://doi.org/10.1145/3072528. 
British Academy, & Royal Society. (2017). Data management and use: Governance in the 
21st century A joint report by the British Academy and the Royal Society. https:// 
royalsociety.org/~/media/policy/projects/data-governance/data-management- 
governance.pdf. 
BSR. (2018). Artificial Intelligence: A Rights-Based Blueprint for Business Paper 3: 
Implementing Human Rights Due Diligence [Working paper]. BSR. 
Bynum, T. W. (2006). Flourishing Ethics. Ethics and Information Technology, 8(4), 
157–173. 
Bynum, Terrell Ward, & Rogerson, S. (2003). Computer Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility: Introductory Text and Readings. WileyBlackwell.  
Cairns, G., & Wright, G. (2017). Scenario Thinking: Preparing Your Organization for the 
Future in an Unpredictable World. Springer.  
Capurro, R. (2006). Towards an ontological foundation of information ethics. Ethics and 
Information Technology, 8(4), 175–186. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-006-9108- 
0. 
Carter, O., Hohwy, J., van Boxtel, J., Lamme, V., Block, N., Koch, C., & Tsuchiya, N. 
(2018). Conscious machines: Defining questions, 400 400 Science, 359(6374). 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aar4163. 
Cath, C. J. N., Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B., Taddeo, M., & Floridi, L. (2016). Artificial 
Intelligence and the “Good Society”: The US, EU, and UK Approach (SSRN Scholarly 
Paper ID 2906249). Social Science Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstr 
act=2906249. 
Cavoukian, A. (2017). Global privacy and security, by design: Turning the ‘privacy vs. 
security’ paradigm on its head. Health and Technology, 1–5. https://doi.org/ 
10.1007/s12553-017-0207-1. 
CDEI. (2019). Interim report: Review into bias in algorithmic decision-making. Centre for 
Data Ethics and Innovation. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/interim- 
reports-from-the-centre-for-data-ethics-and-innovation/interim-report-review-into- 
bias-in-algorithmic-decision-making. 
Clarke, R. (2019a). Principles and Business Processes for Responsible AI. Computer Law & 
Security Review, 35(4), 410–422. 
Clarke, R. (2019b). Regulatory Alternatives for AI. Computer Law & Security Review, 35 
(4), 398–409. 
Clouser, K. D., & Gert, B. (1990). A Critique of Principlism. Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy, 15(2), 219–236. https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/15.2.219. 
CNIL. (2015). Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) Good Practice. CNIL. http://www.cnil.fr/ 
fileadmin/documents/en/CNIL-PIA-3-GoodPractices.pdf. 
CNIL. (2017a). How Can Humans Keep the Upper Hand? The Ethical Matters Raised by 
Algorithms and Artificial Intelligence. 
CNIL. (2017b). Algorithms and artificial intelligence: CNIL’s report on the ethical issues. 
(The Ethical Matters Raised by Algorithms and Artificial Intelligence). CNIL. https:// 
www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil_rapport_ai_gb_web.pdf. 
Committee on Bioethics (DH-BIO). (2019). Strategic Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Technologies in Biomedicine (2020-2025) (CM(2019)198). Council of Europe. 
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=0900001680994df7. 




Decker, M. (2008). Caregiving robots and ethical reflection: The perspective of 
interdisciplinary technology assessment. Ai & Society, 22(3), 315–330. 
Defense Innovation Board. (2019). AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of 
Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense. US Department of Defense. 
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204459/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_ 
PRINCIPLES_SUPPORTING_DOCUMENT.PDF. 
Dehaene, S., Lau, H., & Kouider, S. (2017). What is consciousness, and could machines 
have it? Science, 358(6362), 486–492. 
Doherty, N. F., Coombs, C. R., & Loan-Clarke, J. (2006). A re-conceptualization of the 
interpretive flexibility of information technologies: Redressing the balance between 
the social and the technical. European Journal of Information Systems, 15(6), 569–582. 
Elsevier. (2018). ArtificiaI Intelligence: How knowledge is created, transferred, and 
used—Trends in China, Europe, and the United States. Elsevier. https://www. 
elsevier.com/?a=827872. 
Commission, European (2018). COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE 
REGIONS Artificial Intelligence for Europe (COM(2018) 237 final). European 
Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-201 
8-237-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF. 
General Data Protection Regulation, (2016) (testimony of European Parliament & 
European Council). http://www.dhealth.co.uk/resources/Documents/Event% 
20Content/CONSIL-ST_5419_2016_INIT-EN-TXT.pdf. 
Finn, R. L., Wright, D., & Friedewald, M. (2013). Seven Types of Privacy. In S. Gutwirth, 
R. Leenes, P. de Hert, & Y. Poullet (Eds.), European Data Protection: Coming of Age (pp. 
3–32). Netherlands: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5170-5_1.  
Floridi, L. (1999). Information ethics: On the philosophical foundation of computer 
ethics. Ethics and Information Technology, 1(1), 33–52. 
Floridi, Luciano (Ed.). (2010). The Cambridge Handbook of Information and Computer 
Ethics. Cambridge University Press.  
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